“Can possible worlds be used for analyzing counterfactual conditionals?”

Autores/as

  • Jesús Jasso Méndez Universidad Autónoma de la Ciudad de México

Palabras clave:

Mundos posibles, condicionales, condicionales contrafactuales, semántica, Lewis, Kripke

Resumen

The goal of this paper is not to elaborate an elucidation of the notion of possible world, but to show some of the difficulties the usage of this notion yields if it is considered to be the ontological basis of a truth-conditional semantics for counterfactuals.

Citas

Lewis, D (1973), Counterfactuals, B. Blackwell, Oxford.

Kripke, S (1972), Naming and Necessity, Blackwell, Oxford. Versión española de Margarita M. Valdés (1980), Instituto de Investigaciones Filosófica-UNAM, México.

R. M. Chisholm (1967), “Identity Trough Possible Worlds: some questions”, in Nous, Vol. I.

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Publicado

2024-11-20

Número

Sección

Filosofía