Introduction to the conceptual categories of biolaw on legal discretion

Abstract

The identification of the epistemological dispersion regarding decisions made in biolaw becomes evident in the critical incorporation of materialism and new forms of physicalism, since its epistemological
basis refers to a broader context than the unifying relationship between mind and brain. Hence, the argumentative theories adopted by authors such as Wroblesky, Aarnio and Alexy, who identify a double requirement to justify, namely: 1) the internal justification, regulated by logic when connecting premises or staments that are part of the judicial reasoning; 2) the external justification that emphasizes in the arguments or reasons to justify those premises or staments.
Biolaw implies recognizing that psychopathology has already traveled the road to understand phenomena such as intentionality, interpretation and interpretative assumptions of the architecture of legal decision. Those who study biolaw must identify those assumptions that sometimes are thoughtless. This implies giving reasons about the underlying mind-body relationship, those elements that make up the legal the relevant human action, and the configuration of the basic human goods involved in the litis of the biolaw. All these elements that force us to rethink the cognitive status of the law in general, and the biolaws in particular.