The judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court of 9 April 2025 (appeal 4146/2023): latest doctrine on the possibility of bringing up defects in final administrative acts as consented at the time of challenging sanctions linked to them

Abstract

In recent years, the Spanish Supreme Court has ruled on the possibility of invoking defects in final acts —and, therefore, not reviewable except by the special procedures provided for this purpose— when appealing administrative sanctions. Such a circumstance may occur, according to the Spanish High Court, provided that such sanctions are closely linked to the final acts insofar as they serve as a logical basis for the ius puniendi of the State. This has been particularly relevant in relation to tax penalties, since in many cases they are quantified on the basis of the assessments issued by the corresponding Administration, which may have become final as they have not been appealed (or have been appealed out of time). The Spanish Supreme Court has handed down a series of rulings on this issue which are —at least apparently— contradictory. And the latest decision is the ruling of 9 April 2025 (appeal 4146/2023), which seems to shed more darkness than light on the controversial issue. The commentary reviews the recent case law of the Spanish Supreme Court on the matter and offers some critical considerations.